Publication date:
14 November 2014Length of book:
200 pagesPublisher
Lexington BooksISBN-13: 9780739196410
Why do some civil wars last a long time, while others end relatively quickly? Trust and Fear in Civil Wars examines the conditions under which individuals are willing to lay down their weapons under a settlement agreement. The author argues that wars are easiest to resolve when combatants believe that their adversaries will uphold a deal or that the costs of renewed war will be low. Several key sources of information inform this calculation. Drawing on both cross-national and case study data, including detailed interviews, the book demonstrates that when information suggests either that a peace agreement is likely to break down or that the results of a broken deal will be especially deadly, a settlement leaves combatants too vulnerable to countenance, resulting in wars lasting longer.
Kirschner’s theory has the potential of being more broadly applied, which makes the book a worthwhile read. . . .Current conflicts such as in the Middle East, northern Africa and Ukraine show the obvious relevance of the theory. The quantitative analysis forms an interesting foundation to build future case studies from. The chapters containing case studies offer insights into the conflicts studied with the focus on trust and fear. . . .The findings from these semi-structured interviews do invite other scholars to conduct comparative research using the same hypotheses.